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Perspectives
A
dvances in technology have 
made it possible to sequence 
a whole human genome [1,2]. 
National and international funding 
initiatives have stimulated whole-
genome research activities [3,4], and 
media coverage of both the science 
[5,6] and the emerging commercial 
offerings [7,8] related to genome 
research has heightened public 
awareness and interest in personal 
genomics. As technology continues 
to advance, whole-genome research 
activities seem likely to intensify 
and expand, necessitating carefully 
considered consensus guidelines for 
ethical research practice. 
To date, there has been only 
minimal consideration of the research 
ethics issues associated with this work 
[9–12]. We therefore convened an 
interdisciplinary consensus workshop 
to develop ethically rigorous and 
practical guidance for investigators 
and research ethics boards. What 
follows are recommendations on the 
four topics that were the focus of the 
workshop. These topics—consent, 
withdrawal from research, return 
of research results, and public data 
release—were selected because they 
were viewed as being among the most 
pressing research ethics issues and 
as representing areas where whole-
genome analysis creates unique 
challenges. They are not, of course, 
the only policy issues that need to 
be considered; commercialization, 
patenting, beneﬁt sharing, and the 
possibility of genetic discrimination 
are among other topics that warrant 
reﬂection. Regardless, the four topics 
covered in this paper are current issues 
worthy of immediate attention. 
The paper starts with initial 
considerations, including general 
recommendations about governance 
and the characterization of the 
research activities related to the whole 
genome. It is important to note that 
while there was consensus on all 
recommendations, there was a good 
deal of debate about the degree to 
which they satisfy existing ethical and 
legal norms [13]. All participants 
believed that we need both empirical 
research and continued conceptual 
analysis (Box 1). These are early days 
in the ﬁeld of whole-genome research. 
Research ethics guidance is needed 
immediately, but we should continue 
to explore the ethical, legal, and social 
implications of this rapidly evolving 
ﬁeld (Box 2). Indeed, the door must 
remain open for further reﬂection on 
these and other social concerns. 
Initial Considerations, Governance, 
and Oversight
Whole-genome research can be utilized 
in a wide variety of contexts, including 
as a mode to advance sequencing 
technology, to develop a research 
resource platform, and to do disease-
speciﬁc investigations. Regardless of 
the purpose of the activity, whole-
genome research may implicate issues 
and ethics norms associated with 
population health (particularly when 
used in conjunction with biobanks and 
cohort studies), the provision of health 
care, and research. Recognizing that 
the characterization and resolution of 
ethical challenges will vary depending 
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Perspectives provide experts with a forum to 
comment on topical or controversial issues of broad 
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on which domain is used as the lens 
of analysis, we explicitly chose to 
consider the following issues from the 
perspective of research ethics. This lens 
was chosen because most of the current 
work seems to be research activities 
and, for the purpose of governance and 
regulation, should be characterized as 
such. In addition, given the preliminary 
nature of the technology, it was felt that 
it was prudent to frame whole-genome 
sequencing as a biomedical research 
enterprise, and more speciﬁcally as 
research involving human subjects. 
As with other emerging areas of 
research (e.g., biobanking initiatives) 
[14,15], whole-genome sequencing 
tests traditional clinical trials ethics 
paradigms, particularly in the areas 
discussed below. For example, the 
vast amount of data produced, the 
uncertain future research uses of the 
data, the implications of the data for 
family members, and the technological 
ability (and expectations) to publicly 
release the data are realities that 
challenge existing research ethics 
norms. While these issues have 
emerged in other contexts [16,17], 
they seem particularly acute in the 
context of whole-genome research. For 
example, this research will produce 
an amount of genetic information 
about an individual well beyond what is 
currently done in most genetic research 
protocols. Also, given the recent rapid 
advances and intense interest in whole-
genome research, it seems worthwhile 
to consider how existing research ethics 
norms apply. 
This area of research invites a 
move beyond reliance on the usual 
informed consent strategies [18], to the 
utilization of robust governance and 
oversight mechanisms [19]. Ideally, 
the governance scheme should have a 
mandate to ensure research integrity 
and the protection of the interests 
of all stakeholders, including the 
public, participants, family members, 
communities, and the research 
community at large. Governance 
structures should reﬂect the nature and 
scope of the particular whole-genome 
research protocol (Figure 1). A project 
involving a single research participant 
would have a more modest governance 
framework than an initiative engaging 
a large number of individuals or a 
particular population or community. 
Also, in designing governance 
structures, investigators should draw 
on existing ethics resources (e.g., local 
committees and experts). Attention has 
to be paid to concerns that research 
ethics review structures may not always 
be sufﬁciently independent and 
that improvements to the system are 
needed to promote their accountability 
[20]. Regardless, as will be discussed, 
appropriate governance schemes 
seem essential to the ethical conduct 
of whole-genome investigations—in 
part because the unique challenges 
associated with the research make it 
impractical to satisfy the norms, tools, 
and processes usually utilized to respect 
autonomy (e.g., speciﬁc informed 
consent). Also, the ethical issues often 
move beyond autonomy challenges 
alone [21]. 
Consent
Whole-genome research involves the 
collection of a biological sample, the 
sequencing of the genome, various 
levels of data analysis, and, possibly, 
the use of the sample and/or data for a 
wide variety of future research projects 
that are likely unknown at the time 
that the sample is taken. In addition, 
the data may be released into scientiﬁc 
databases that are publicly accessible 
in order to facilitate research (to be 
discussed below). These activities create 
tremendous consent challenges. 
First, the implications and 
potential social risks associated 
with the sequencing of an entire 
genome remain unknown. While 
most of the data will have limited 
immediate clinical signiﬁcance, the 
massive volume of the data triggers 
challenges to protecting privacy and 
respecting autonomy. In addition, 
as will be discussed below, whole-
genome research creates complex 
ethics challenges associated with the 
repercussions of data release and 
return of results, all of which must 
be covered in the initial informed 
consent process. The involvement of 
commercial entities and the potential 
commercialization of research results 
complicate the process even more. 
Given the uncertainty and complexity 
of the activity, ensuring fully informed 
consent will be difﬁcult. 
Second, the fact that there will 
likely be many unspeciﬁed future 
uses for the data raises the question 
of whether reconsent is required. 
Given that numerous investigators may 
be using the data over an extended 
The following is a list of research 
ethics questions that warrant future 
investigation and analysis. It is not an 
exhaustive list of the research ethics 
questions associated with whole-genome 
research.
1. Duty to Recontact: Given the 
numerous disciplines and health care 
providers potentially involved in 
whole-genome research, further 
analysis of the legal and ethical 
obligations of each (particularly in 
the context of return of results) seems 
warranted. Who has what obligations? 
Who, if anyone, has the duty to return 
results? Is there a “chain of obligation” 
that runs through the various 
members of a research team?
2. Right to Withdraw: Because of the 
potential for the rapid dissemination 
of research results, the right 
to withdraw can quickly become 
impractical. This raises the issue of 
the degree to which there is an ethical 
requirement to structure the research 
and dissemination of results in a 
manner that will allow the right 
to withdraw to endure as long as 
possible. As such, this issue should 
be investigated with consideration of 
existing and evolving legal and ethical 
norms, emerging information 
technology tools that may facilitate 
withdrawal, and governance structures 
that can be implemented.
3. Risk/Beneﬁt Analysis: There is a 
need for a comprehensive risk/beneﬁt 
analysis of public data sharing. Studies 
that explore the impact on research 
of restricted access versus open access 
would be useful, and should include a 
consideration of costs and actual risk 
of harm.
4. Governance Structures: There is a 
need to systematically evaluate 
existing and emerging governance 
structures. This should include a 
consideration of the ways in which 
new information technologies can be 
utilized to facilitate, inter alia: 
continued communication with 
participants; the continued right 
to withdraw; and, when appropriate, 
community engagement. 
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period, reconsenting all individuals 
who participate in whole-genome 
research for all uses of the data seems 
impractical—a challenge that has been 
encountered in other areas of research, 
such as biobanking [13,22]. 
Finally, when individuals provide 
consent for whole-genome scanning of 
their own biological material, this also 
has implications for family members 
and community members with whom 
they share some genetic information. 
Traditional individually based informed 
consent procedures do not deal well 
with this aspect of genetic research. 
Informed consent is a foundational 
principle in research ethics [23,24]. 
It is meant to respect individual 
autonomy. While it is recognized 
that consent remains essential, in the 
context of whole-genome research it 
is not likely that it can be fully satisﬁed 
nor do all the work. As such, the 
consent process must be supplemented 
with a governance structure that can 
respond to the particular ethics issues 
associated with whole-genome research. 
Recommendation 1. Prior to 
participation in a whole-genome 
project, participants should be asked 
to provide consent for future use that 
includes as much detail as possible, 
including information about the 
sampling and sequencing process, 
associated commercialization activities, 
possible risks, and the nature of 
likely future research initiatives. The 
consent process should also include 
information about data security and the 
governance structure and, in particular, 
the mechanism for considering future 
research protocols (Figure 1). When 
deemed appropriate by the governance 
scheme, reconsent for speciﬁc research 
projects may be required (e.g., when 
the proposal deviates signiﬁcantly from 
what was stated in the initial consent). 
Withdrawal from Research
The right of research participants to 
withdraw consent at any time, for any 
reason and without repercussions 
is a central component of existing 
research ethics statements [23–25]. In 
general, this right extends to research 
on identiﬁable health information 
and tissue samples [26]. In the context 
of whole-genome research, this right 
endures and must be respected. 
Indeed, any minimization of the 
right to withdraw could pose a threat 
to public trust. However, because 
whole-genome research results in the 
production of data that, when used for 
research, are likely to be disseminated 
rapidly and widely (depending on the 
relevant data release policy), there 
will inevitably be profound practical 
limitations to the right to withdraw. 
Indeed, once whole-genome research 
data are released, it will be very 
difﬁcult, if not impossible, to retrieve 
or destroy the data in response to a 
withdrawal request. 
So, while research participants 
retain the right to withdraw their 
consent whenever possible (e.g., they 
could request the destruction of the 
relevant tissue sample or the severance 
of ongoing linkages to personal 
information), it will often be impossible 
to destroy data that have already been 
released. As part of the ethics review 
process, there should be a careful 
consideration of how far along the 
research process withdrawal can (and 
should) be possible. This should also 
be done in order to inform the consent 
process and to ascertain the proper 
balance between research goals and the 
right to withdraw. 
Recommendation 2. The right 
to withdraw consent, including the 
destruction of tissue samples and 
written information, must, so far as 
possible, be respected and be part 
of the whole-genome research ethics 
process. In addition, the fact that this 
right may be severely limited once 
data are disseminated must be clearly 
communicated as part of the initial 
informed consent process. 
Recommendation 3. The design of 
personal genome projects and ethics 
review should explicitly consider how 
the ability to withdraw from subsequent 
use is enhanced or diminished by how 
data and samples are collected, stored, 
and disseminated. The appropriate 
balance will need to be considered for 
each project on a case-by-case basis. 
Return of Results
Even if the purpose of some whole-
genome research is not to provide 
results about individual participants, 
the work may generate such results, 
ranging on a continuum from clinically 
signiﬁcant information to information 
relevant to ancestry and genealogy 
to information that is merely of 
recreational interest. 
On this continuum, there may 
be situations in which the research 
generates genetic information that 
the researcher has a moral (but not 
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060073.g001
Figure 1. Example Governance Structure 
The following governance structure is similar to other policies [22]. It is only an example and should 
be modiﬁed to meet the needs and scope of each research initiative. The mandate and scope of 
the entity’s responsibilities, obligations, and powers should be clear and should be reconciled with 
roles and requirements of existing ethics review committees. The membership of the entity, their 
criteria and process for making decisions, and the review and appeal system should be publicly 
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necessarily legal) obligation to offer to 
individual participants [27,28]. Such 
research may also generate results 
that could be detrimental or that a 
research participant has speciﬁcally 
asked not to be returned. Due to 
the unknown clinical value of much 
of the genomic data, the amount 
of information that a researcher 
might have a duty to disclose will 
likely be small at the current time. 
However, it is expected to grow 
with increased knowledge about the 
clinical signiﬁcance of the genome. 
In addition, some associations will 
be found by other research teams, 
warranting review and tough decisions 
about whether to invest time in 
conﬁrming results for one’s own study 
population and informing subjects 
about those secondary ﬁndings [29].
The duty to offer results is, in part, 
related to the relationship between 
researchers and participants. It may 
also be based on expectations founded 
on institutional or cultural assumptions. 
Because results may be generated by 
researchers who did not collect the 
samples and who may not know the 
identity of the research participants, 
there are interesting questions about 
who may have a duty to offer results. 
Do researchers who provide samples or 
data to other researchers for secondary 
analyses retain responsibility to support 
return of appropriate results?
Recommendation 4. Personal
genome research projects should have 
an established process, approved by 
a research ethics review entity, for 
evaluating whether ﬁndings (incidental 
or otherwise) meet criteria for offering 
to individual participants (Figure 1). 
This process should be highlighted 
in the initial consent and should 
acknowledge the participants’ right not 
to know certain results. 
Recommendation 5. The process 
of identifying and disclosing research 
results should involve professionals 
with the appropriate expertise required 
to provide the participant with 
sufﬁcient interpretive information. 
In general, the results offered should 
be scientiﬁcally valid, conﬁrmed, and 
should have signiﬁcant implications 
for the subject’s health and well-being. 
Plans to return other forms of data—
such as signiﬁcant non-health-related 
data—should be built into the study 
design and governance structure. 
The ability to sequence an individual’s 
entire genome will allow for the 
production of an unprecedented amount 
of detailed genetic information, helping 
researchers to explore the relationship 
of genes and environment in the 
development of a wide variety of human 
diseases.
But imagine being a research 
participant in this exciting new ﬁeld. 
Researchers would be seeking to 
produce a record of all your genetic 
information. As a result, all known 
genetic predispositions will be available 
and, depending on the data sharing 
policy, accessible to a wide range of 
researchers and, possibly, the public at 
large—this, at a time when we are still 
seeking to understand the social, clinical, 
and personal implications of genetic 
information.
These uncertainties can create unique 
ethical challenges. What do you tell 
potential participants during the consent 
process about risks when we still don’t 
have a clear sense of their nature? Also, 
it is difﬁcult to know, at the time of 
recruitment, exactly how the genetic 
information will be used, and by whom. 
While most of the risks remain 
speculative, and we imagine that much 
of this research will be conducted by 
highly respected researchers at leading 
academic centers, one can imagine a 
number of controversial scenarios. Some 
of these may seem far-fetched, and we 
do not intend to be alarmist, but it is 
important to recognize that just one 
breach similar to those described below, 
or even the threat of such a breach, could 
hurt public trust and signiﬁcantly hamper 
the ability to conduct genetic research.
Imagine you are watching the news 
and learn about a study linking race to IQ, 
which you ﬁnd offensive. You later learn 
that they used your DNA for this study. 
You donated your DNA ﬁve years ago 
for use in a genetic association study of 
cancer and heart disease. At the time, you 
were told that other researchers might 
want to use your DNA for other types 
of research. You want to withdraw your 
consent, but it is too late. Your genetic 
information has been analyzed by many 
researchers and is now integrated in 
databanks throughout the world.
Imagine that you are sitting home, 
minding your own business, and the 
police show up at your door with a 
search warrant. They are looking for 
the suspect from a crime scene 2,000 
miles away in Des Moines, Iowa. It turns 
out that some DNA that was left at the 
crime scene matched a sample from a 
publicly accessible scientiﬁc database 
that contained DNA from one of your 
brothers.
Imagine that at the time you ﬁrst 
donated your sample for genetic 
research, it was explained as part of the 
consent process that no information 
about your genetics would be returned 
to you. Years later, you develop a 
heritable form of cancer and learn that 
the research team must have known 
you were genetically predisposed to the 
disease. To complicate matters further, 
you have a large number of siblings, 
none of whom want to know about their 
genetic predispositions. This information 
is now available to all. 
Imagine you just opened your own 
electronics recycling business and are 
trying to ﬁnd private health insurance. 
Your friend recommends that you 
contact a speciﬁc company. As part of the 
enrollment process, the company ﬁnds 
out that you participated in a genetic 
study and that your genetic information 
has been released into a publicly 
accessible database. By accessing the 
database, the company ﬁnds out that 
you are at increased risk of early-onset 
Alzheimer disease and are highly 
susceptible to cancer from the chemicals 
encountered in your recycling process. 
They also ﬁnd that you are at greatly 
increased risk of colon cancer, which 
alerts you to now take early screening 
and preventive measures.
This is, no doubt, an exciting time for 
genetic research. And it cannot move 
forward without research participants. 
As such, it is important to note that the 
risks associated with this kind of research 
may be limited and controversial events 
rare. But history has told us that they 
do occur and can have a devastating 
impact on public trust and the research 
environment. It is therefore critical that 
as this research moves forward, there 
are guidelines in place, such as those 
outlined by this paper, to promote ethical 
research conduct and to help avoid, as 
much as possible, scenarios like those 
described above.
Box 2. Personal Genome Research: What Are the Possible Risks?
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Public Data Release 
International policies call for the rapid 
public release of all sequence data 
[30–32]. The beneﬁt of public data 
access is that it provides signiﬁcant 
scientiﬁc utility by enabling immediate 
international research use of the 
data. However, policies that advocate 
unrestricted data sharing have been 
challenged because of the privacy 
risks associated with public access 
to genomic information [33,34]. 
Whole-genome research increases 
these privacy concerns, particularly 
the uncertainties surrounding the 
implications of the data. As a result, a 
cautious approach seems warranted. 
Investigators and research ethics boards 
need to carefully consider whether 
public data release is warranted.
 As noted above, once data are 
released into a publicly accessible 
database, it becomes impossible to 
withdraw the data from the public 
domain. The ﬁnality of public data 
sharing needs to be clearly articulated 
in the informed consent process. 
A balanced approach should be 
adopted when explaining the risks 
and beneﬁts of data sharing. In the 
consent and review process, neither the 
beneﬁts of research nor the potential 
privacy risks should be minimized or 
exaggerated. In this regard, several 
potential privacy issues should be 
discussed: the data security mechanisms 
put in place; the primary concern of 
identiﬁability; the practical limits on 
an individual’s right to control access 
to their personal information; and 
the secondary concern about genetic 
proﬁling and an individual’s right to 
control their “ascribed social identity” 
[35]. Given the complexity of these 
privacy challenges, it is essential that 
the relevant ethics review entity have 
appropriate ethics expertise. 
More research and policy analysis on 
the issues associated with data release is 
clearly needed, including an analysis of 
the actual harms and beneﬁts resulting 
from publicly accessible data; the 
implications for family members and 
relevant communities; the appropriate 
balance between public access and 
individual privacy interests; and 
considerations regarding compensation 
for research-related injury resulting 
from participation in personal genome 
research. While the likelihood of injury 
is small, compensating individuals 
for harm or loss associated with 
research participation would promote 
reciprocity for participation in research 
with no direct beneﬁt to the individual.
It may be more appropriate to 
release genome data into databases 
with restricted access. Restricted 
access databases typically require some 
authentication so that only bona ﬁde 
researchers can access the information. 
Most restricted access databases provide 
some phenotypic information linked 
to the genotypic data, increasing the 
scientiﬁc utility of the data. Restricted 
access provides enhanced privacy 
protection, but the level of restriction 
and stringency of oversight vary 
signiﬁcantly depending on the database 
(e.g., the degree to which the database 
contains sensitive or identifying 
information). Regardless, appropriate 
security, oversight, and access policies 
are essential for the protection of 
human subjects.
Recommendation 6. Data release 
policies must be designed to 
appropriately balance the beneﬁts 
and requirements of access against 
the privacy interests of research 
participants. The rationale for the 
proposed data release policy needs 
to be clearly explained, justiﬁed as 
necessary for the goals of research, 
and deemed acceptable by the relevant 
ethics review entity. 
Recommendation 7. The
implications of data release must be 
adequately disclosed to the potential 
participants in the consent process. 
This disclosure should include a 
discussion of the likely ﬁnality of the 
release process and the implications 
that this may have on privacy and the 
future right to withdraw.
Recommendation 8. As part of the 
consent and ethics review process, the 
issues associated with family members 
and relevant groups and populations 
should be considered (this may, 
for example, involve encouraging/
requiring discussions with family 
members).  
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